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This paper uses a new data set to estimate the causes and consequences of foreign currency
debt in ￿rms’ balance sheet. The evidence from this sample of Chilean ￿rms indicates that dollar-
denominated debt is more used by larger ￿rms and those more exposed to foreign competition.
We ￿nd evidence that dollar denominated debt combines with exchange rate movements to
produce a negative balance-sheet e￿ect that reduces ￿rm’s investment in periods of strong
exchange rate depreciation. This negative balance-sheet e￿ect is associated with long term debt
and appears to be non-linear in the amount of real exchange rate depreciation.
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The presence of dollarized debt in ￿rms’ balance sheets and the implications it might have for
the functioning of the economy emerged as central topics in the research agenda of international
economists after the Asian ￿nancial crises observed in the late 1990s. The signi￿cant devaluation
of many Asian countries’ currencies and the severe contraction in economic activity that followed
were attributed in part to the existence of dollar debt on the balance sheets of many corporations.
Krugman (1999) was one of the ￿rst to identify this balance-sheet channel as the mechanism through
which the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate could have devastating e￿ects on the aggregate
level of economic activity.
The preceding analysis leads naturally to the following two questions:
1. Why do ￿rms in emerging markets contract debt whose payments are denominated in dollars?
2. How does the presence of dollar-debt in￿uence the e￿ect that exchange rate ￿uctuations have
on ￿rms’ investment?
These are the two problems that we will investigate in this paper. Both are important ques-
tions whose resolution is still a pending issue in the International Finance literature. Our goal is
to contribute to this literature from an empirical viewpoint. For this we will use a new database of
Chilean ￿rms that is extremely well suited to analyze the dollarization phenomenon.
The use of the U.S. dollar in ￿nancial contracts in developing countries is a phenomenon that
has been analyzed before in both the Development and International Macroeconomics literatures.
The ￿rst example of this is the currency substitution literature that studies why the U.S. dollar
displaces the domestic currency as medium of exchange, unit of account and store of value in
(usually) high-in￿ation countries. In a more recent development, various researchers have pointed
1out to the existence of an original sin that prevents emerging markets from issuing in international
capital markets debt that is payable in the country’s own currency. 1 The original sin literature has
focused mainly on the dollarization of o￿cial (i.e. government) debt.
In contrast, in this work we will shift the focus of attention to the use of the U.S. dollar in
debt contracts by ￿rms operating in an emerging economy. Due to limitations on the availability of
adequate data, research on this area is relatively novel and there is no clear empirical consensus on
the signi￿cance of balance-sheet e￿ects. In this paper we will use a unique data set that contains
detailed ￿nancial information for a sample of Chilean ￿rms. There are several reasons that make
this topic one that deserves further attention, and various characteristics of the Chilean economy
that make it an interesting case to study.
In ￿rst place, it will permit us to know more about corporate ￿nance decisions in emerging
economies. This will enhance our understanding of how ￿rms’ ￿nancing structure responds to
changes in domestic and foreign currency-denominated interest rates, exchange rate ￿uctuations
and changes in the exchange rate regime.
A second reason that makes this an important topic and the country to be studied a relevant
one, is that it will teach us what happens to the ￿nancial structure of ￿rms when a country liberalizes
its capital account. As documented by several authors, Chile opened its capital account - especially
to in￿ows- during the 1990s and it would be interesting to examine how this phenomenon a￿ected the
currency composition of ￿rms’ liabilities. This is especially important to extract policy lessons for
economies that attempt to liberalize their capital accounts. In this sense, this paper will contribute
to improve our understanding of how the structure of the international ￿nancial system will evolve
as emerging economies continue to open themselves to foreign capital ￿ows.
The Chilean case is also interesting since in the period under study there were no major
1Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) were the ￿rst to introduce the term ￿original sin￿ into the economics literature.
2economic crises and the exchange rate regime cannot be characterized as ￿xed. 2 This feature adds
to the interest of the study since, as will be described, most other studies that have previously
addressed these issues, have dealt with countries involved in severe economic downturns, frequently
caused by the collapse of ￿xed exchange regimes. Chile’s experience will shed some light on the
e￿ects of exchange rate ￿uctuations during more tranquil periods.
Apart from helping us to understand the ￿nancial structure of ￿rms in emerging markets,
this paper will study eventual pathologies that the dollarization of ￿rms’ ￿nancial structure might
cause. As discussed earlier, we are especially interested in knowing if dollar-denominated debt
in￿uences the way in which exchange rate movements a￿ect the ￿rm. The key mechanism that we
are interested in examining is if the additional payments -measured in domestic currency- associated
with dollarized debt that the ￿rm needs to make when the exchange rate depreciates a￿ect the ￿rm’s
creditworthiness and investment. This is what has been called the balance-sheet channel through
which exchange rates could exert a powerful e￿ect on the economy.
The existence of this channel is based on the ￿rmly established fact that ￿rms’ investment
depends positively on the amount of internal funds it has available. 3 However, the depreciation of
the nominal exchange rate can also be bene￿cial for the ￿rm’s investment. As is well know, the
income of several ￿rms is positively tied to exchange rate ￿uctuations. This is the case of ￿rms
producing in the tradable sectors of the economy. Therefore it is also possible that exchange rate
movements improve the value of capital allocated to the tradable sector, with a consequent boost to
investment. Then, when analyzing the balance-sheet mechanism it is central to consider the degree
of currency mismatch between the ￿rm’s ￿nancial structure and ￿ow of income.
2At the beginning of the period of study (1991-2001) the exchange rate regime consisted of target zone that was
subject to various alterations in subsequent years. In 1999 the Central Bank of Chile withdrew its commitment to
defend the exchange rate bands moving towards a more pure ￿oat.
3The literature that analyzes the ￿nancial market imperfections investment has a long tradition in macroeconomics.
Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder and Poterba (1988) compare the empirical performances of q-based models with
the ones that incorporate ￿nancial imperfections and report that the latter have strong empirical support. More
recently Hall, Mairesse and Mulkay (2000) survey several studies of ￿rm-level investment and conclude that internal
cash ￿ow has a clear and robust e￿ect on ￿rm’s investment.
3The possibility that dollar debt and its associated currency mismatch could be harmful for the
economy has important implications for the design of economic policy. Eichengreen, Hausmann and
Panizza (2003) document and study the negative consequences that foreign currency denominated
debt has for the functioning of the economy. These authors use country-level data and conclude
that higher levels of currency mismatch in a country’s debt are associated with (i) lower credit
ratings and hence more expensive ￿nancing, (ii) higher fear of ￿oating as de￿ned by Calvo and
Reinhart (2002) and, (iii) higher output volatility. On related work, CØspedes (2005) and Calvo,
Izquierdo and Mej￿a (2004) also document using macroeconomic data the threat to macroeconomic
stability posed by foreign currency denominated debt. This paper will contribute to this literature
by providing microeconomic evidence to serve as complement to the macroeconomic approach used
by these papers.
This rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a brief review
of the previous literature on dollar-denominated debt. Section 3 describes a new data set that
will be used to analyze our research questions. The empirical strategy with which we study these
phenomena is presented in Section4. The next section presents the results we have obtained. Section
6 summarizes the main conclusions and policy lessons and suggests further areas of research.
2 Literature Review
The issue of dollarization of ￿nancial contracts has been widely studied in the International Finance
and International Macroeconomics literature, specially the one that focuses on developing countries.
A major branch of the literature tries to explain the degree of dollarization of the ￿nancial and
banking systems and why it varies across countries and time. These literature is well summarized
by the work of Ize and Levi-Yeyati (2003), De Nicolo, Honohan and Ize (2003) and Levy-Yeyati
(2006). Those papers use macroeconomic data to evaluate both the causes and consequences of
currency substitution for developing economies. That work sparkled in part the recent interest on
4the microeconomic aspects of ￿rm dollarization. Since this paper deals with dollarization at the
￿rm level, we will focus on a revision of the literature that concentrates on microeconomics aspects
of currency mismatches. In particular we will discuss ￿rst previous work that has aimed to explain
the determinants of ￿rms’ currency composition of debt and continue next with the papers that
have tried to identify a balance-sheet e￿ect at the ￿rm level in the aftermath of exchange rate
depreciation.
Several authors have tried to explain from a theoretical perspective ￿rms’ motivations to
contract debt that promises payment in dollars. Since a comprehensive review of the literature is
beyond the scope of this work, we will mention the most representative papers that illustrate well
the main approaches taken by researchers in the ￿eld.
In ￿rst place, Jeanne (2000) attributes the presence of dollarized debt in ￿rms’ balance-sheet
to the combination of a ￿xed exchange rate regime and an implicit guarantee that the government
will assist ￿rms that become insolvent if devaluation occurs. This type of explanation is inspired by
the experience of many developing countries and stresses the role of misplaced incentives as the cause
of debt dollarization. In a related paper, Jeanne (2005) builds a theoretical model that identi￿es
the lack of credibility of a country’s monetary policy as one of the main elements to explain foreign
currency denominated debt. As can be seen, this line of research stresses the role of (inadequate)
domestic institutions in the emergence of dollar-denominated debt.
Along these same lines, Tirole (2002) views dollar debt as the mechanism used by the private
sector to induce the government to keep its compromise with the pegged exchange rate. Dollarized
liabilities emerge then in the equilibrium of the political economy game played between domestic
entrepreneurs and the government. Although Tirole’s model has strong theoretical foundations
it is hard to derive from it any simple empirical predictions on the determinants and e￿ects of
dollar-denominated debt.
5Next, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) explain dollar debt as a consequence of the under-
development of ￿nancial markets in emerging economies. An interesting implication of this work is
that the scope of dollarization should decline as domestic ￿nancial markets become more sophisti-
cated. This ￿nancial-underdevelopment argument can be complemented with the insights provided
by the corporate ￿nance literature as exempli￿ed by Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993). In the
work of those authors currency mismatches in ￿rms debt portfolios is the optimal decision of a ￿rm
manager seeking to hedge the currency risk inherent to the ￿rm￿s business as would be the case of
multinational ￿rm operating in several countries. In the empirical analysis we will used elements
derived from both lines of work to study the determinants of ￿rm-level dollarization.
Although all these papers provide interesting insights about the dollarization of ￿nancial
contracts, they are subject to some critiques. In ￿rst place, a crisis scenario following the collapse of
￿xed exchange rate regimes inspires both Jeanne (2000) and Tirole (2002)’s work, so their validity
for explaining the forces that lead to dollarization in a ￿oating exchange rate regime is not clear.
Secondly, the majority of the models reviewed here predict a corner solution where all of the ￿rm’s
debt is predicted to be payable in dollars. As we will show in section5, this is a feature soundly
rejected by the data used in this paper and by the evidence presented by other authors who have
worked on this topic.
The empirical study of the determinants ￿rms’ debts dollarization has been an active area of
research in recent years. This has been the result of the availability of databases containing ￿rm
level data for several countries. An excellent example of the empirical literature appears in the
December 2003 issue of the journal Emerging Markets Review that discusses the cases of several
Latin American economies. Along with this the papers by Bleakley and Cowan (2002), Gelos (2003),
Cowan, Hansen and Herrera (2006) and Luengnaruemitchai (2003) have also addressed the factors
that in￿uence the fraction of debt that ￿rms and have studied empirically what factors determine
the fraction of dollarized debt in ￿rms’ ￿nancial structure. The general conclusion that can be
6drawn from those studies is that more outward oriented ￿rms -those that export a higher fraction
of their output or operate in the tradable sector of the economy- are the ones that exhibit higher
liability dollarization. 4 Along with this, liability dollarization tends to increase with ￿rms’ size
and leverage level. Although the body of evidence for developed economies is smaller, the evidence
in the paper by Kedia and Mozumdar (2003), which analyzes the currency choice composition of
bonds issued by U.S. corporations, is consistent with the ￿ndings reported for developing countries.
The work on the e￿ects of currency mismatches in ￿rms’ liabilities has also focused over-
whelmingly on developing countries. The main interest has been to study how the combination of
dollar-denominated debt and exchange rate depreciation a￿ects ￿rms’ investment. Before reviewing
what has been previously done in this area, we will explain the mechanism through which dollar
debt can harm the ￿rms’ investment when the domestic currency depreciates. As Krugman (1999)
initially pointed out, when the exchange rate depreciates the ￿rm will need to increase the amount
of ￿nancial resources, measured in pesos, that it needs to meet its debt obligations. 5 Since the de-
pendence of a ￿rm’s investment on its own cash ￿ow is a fact ￿rmly established in previous research,
the larger payments associated to dollarized liabilities after the currency depreciates can negatively
a￿ect the ￿rm’s capacity to obtain ￿nancing and thus to undertake new investment projects.
This channel is the basis for the identi￿cation strategy used in several papers that have studied
the existence of a balance-sheet e￿ect. As summarized by Cowan et al. (2006) the evidence available
until now for di￿erent countries and periods remains mixed: the balance-sheet e￿ect is found to be
negative in some studies, positive in others and non-existent in the remainder. 6 Since a full review
of the empirical literature is beyond the scope of this paper, we will concentrate the discussion on
the papers that have studied this issue for the case of Chile which is the country analyzed in this
4The only major exception to this according to Galindo, Panizza and Schiantarelli (2003) are the cases of Argentina
and Brazil where there is not a strong statistical relation between the degree of outward orientation and the extent
of liability dollarization.
5In this context peso refers to the domestic currency.
6See Table 1 in the working paper version of that paper (Cowan, Hansen and Herrera (2005)) for a summary of
the main ￿ndings of previous empirical work on the existence of balance-sheet e￿ects.
7paper.
The Chilean case has been previously analyzed in Bleakley and Cowan (2002), Benavente,
Johnson and MorandØ (2003) and Cowan et al. (2006). The ￿rst two of these ￿nd that balance-
sheet e￿ect is positive while the last one reports a negative e￿ect after controlling for the e￿ects
of RER depreciation on ￿rms’ pro￿ts and their use of ￿nancial (e.g. foreign currency) derivatives.
In this paper we will explore one further aspect of how the currency mismatch ￿nancial contracts
might interact with RER depreciation and a￿ect ￿rms: the term structure of debt contracts. In
particular we will distinguish among short term and long term debt. This aspect has not been
analyzed for the case of Chile. Aguiar (2005) is, up to our knowledge, the only other study that
has analyzed if the balance-sheet e￿ect di￿ers for long and short term debt. That paper analyzes
the case of Mexico and ￿nds that the balance-sheet e￿ect is associated exclusively with short term
debt. Although Aguiar (2005) is an important contribution, it is based on the Tequila crises episode
of 1994. Since that event was a major disruption to the Mexican economy, the results reported in
that paper might be di￿cult to extrapolate to non-crises situations. The study of the Chilean case
of our paper will therefore complement the study of Aguiar (2005) and could help us understand
how RER changes interact with the ￿nancial structure of ￿rms in more quiet times. This might be
an important channel to gauge how RER movements a￿ect the economy.
3 Data
The data set we use to study the dollarization of ￿nancial contracts will allow us to enrich the
work done in some previous studies. The three main advantages of the data set are (i) it includes a
broader group of ￿rms than the one used in previous studies, (ii) it covers a more extended period
of time and (iii) it has information on short and long term debt. A possible drawback of our sample
is that it contains information for only Chilean ￿rms. This may cast some doubt on how valid
the conclusions of our research are as policy guides for other economies. Nevertheless, the Chilean
8experience has some interesting features as is discussed below from which policy lessons for other
developing economies could be drawn.
The source of the data is the national agency in charge of supervising Chile’s securities market.
That agency is called Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (SVS) and is under the Ministry of
Finance. Under the laws that exist in Chile, all companies that organize themselves under a speci￿c
legal structure must submit their ￿nancial information to the SVS. In practice this means that all
publicly listed companies must comply with this requirement. Nevertheless, non-listed companies
as well as some state-owned ￿rms also comply with the requirement of making their accounting data
available to the SVS. Another important feature of this data is that it contains non-consolidated
balance-sheet information. In practice this means that we will use data of individual corporations
and not from business conglomerates. This is a desirable feature of the data since it indicates more
closely the economic incentives of each manager. Also, conglomerates can include ￿rms operating
in a wide variety of economic sectors. As will be explained below, it is very important for the
purposes of this study to characterize carefully the exact nature of the ￿rm’s activity which makes
conglomerate data less attractive.
Our sample has ￿rm-level observations for the period 1991 to 2001 while Bleakley and Cowan
(2002) have observations for the period 1991-1999, Cowan et al. (2005) for the period 1995-2003
and Benavente et al. (2003) for 1994-2001. Although the samples therefore overlap for a signi￿cant
period, the one used in this paper has potentially very valuable information and advantages in
comparison to the other papers mentioned. As Figure1 shows, it is especially interesting to use ob-
servations after 1999, because currency depreciation was signi￿cantly faster in that period. Indeed,
as mentioned earlier, in 1999 the Central Bank formally abandoned the exchange rate target zone
regime and moved towards a free ￿oat. Therefore, it is still an unresolved issue to examine if dollar-
debt doesn’t constitute an obstacle for investment even in a scenario of more severe depreciation.
On the other hand, the additional sample period considered in this paper is one in which aggregate
9growth and investment exhibited a signi￿cant deceleration in stark contrast to the fast rhythm of
economic activity observed during the 1990s. On the other hand, the sample period used in this
paper also includes the ￿rst years of the 1990s during which the nominal exchange rate depreciated
signi￿cantly. Obviously this feature is shared by Bleakley and Cowan (2002) but not for the other
studies that have analyzed the Chilean experience.
As mentioned earlier, one of the drawbacks of this data set is that it includes data only from
Chilean ￿rms. This di￿ers with Bleakley and Cowan (2002) and Luengnaruemitchai (2003) who use
data from a group of Latin American and Asian economies. Nevertheless, there are several reasons
that make the study of the Chilean case interesting. First, it is di￿cult to get information about
the currency composition ￿rms’ liabilities for an extended period of time for any country. Secondly,
focusing on a single country guarantees that the ￿nancial information used is elaborated using the
same accounting principles.7 Finally, one can argue that since market economies react in similar
manner when exposed to the same incentives, lessons from the Chilean experience can be valuable
for policy makers and researchers more interested in other countries.
Another issue that makes the Chilean experience interesting to study is the widespread use
of in￿ation-indexed contracts in the domestic ￿nancial markets. As the traditional literature on
currency substitution and dollarization has pointed out, the demand for foreign currency and its
use in developing countries is explained essentially by the low quality of the domestic currency. The
inferior quality of the domestic currency is caused chie￿y by the high rate of in￿ation observed in
the country that depletes its value. In this high in￿ation scenario, the dollar appears as a credible
and high-quality substitute for the national currency. An obvious alternative to the use of a foreign
currency to avoid the costs of in￿ation is the introduction of in￿ation-adjusted units of account.
Chile has used this mechanism for a long time and it will be interesting to analyze the dynamics
of dollarization and balance-sheet e￿ects in an economy that has experienced a widespread use of
7Up to our knowledge the only data source that tries to assemble ￿rm-level ￿nancial data based on common
accounting principles (Worldscope) does not include any information about the currency composition of liabilities.
10in￿ation-indexed ￿nancial instruments which supposedly should limit the use of foreign currency.
Finally the data set assembled for this project distinguishes between short-term and long-term
debt.8 Indeed, the reporting requirements put in place by the SVS direct ￿rms to report both the
term and currency structure of their liabilities. We will use this information and, as is explained
below, this feature of the data set turns out to be a particularly important one.
4 Estimation Strategy
The econometric strategy exploits the panel-data structure of the sample to analyze the two research
questions of interest. The panel data approach will enable us to control for the unobservable elements
that might in￿uence the dollarization of ￿nancial contracts. Along with this, recent developments
in panel-data econometrics allow a better modeling of investment that will help us to isolate more
accurately the in￿uence of dollar debt and nominal devaluation on investment.
The estimation strategy should recognize the fact that the amount of dollar debt contracted
by the ￿rm is the outcome of an optimization process. Moreover, the decision to dollarize debt
might be in￿uenced by the same factors that determine the amount of investment. This potential
simultaneity problem will be one of the key concerns of the estimation strategy.
The ￿rst step is to study the determinants of the amount of dollar debt owed by each ￿rm.




= ® + ¸Fi;t + µSi;t + ³i;t (1)
where D$ corresponds to the amount of dollar-denominated debt owed by ￿rmi at the beginning of
8Speci￿cally, short term corresponds to debt that must be paid in full during the next year. Long term debt is
the remaining debt.
11period t, SIZE is measured by total assets, F captures ￿rm’s characteristics like size and ￿nancial
structure while the exposure of the ￿rm to foreign competition is measured byS. The in￿uence
of each of these variables on dollar denominated debt is given by the parameters’ vectors®, ¸,
and µ while ³ is a well-behaved random error. The regressions will also include time and ￿rm-level
￿x e￿ects. Both debt measures in (1) are measured in 1999 pesos as will be the rule for all other
￿nancial variables used in the paper. Next we will explain the selection of each variable in the right
hand side of equation (1) and how they were measured.
The use of foreign exposure measures (S) as a determinant of the degree of dollarization of
a ￿rm’s liabilities can be justi￿ed from both theoretical and empirical grounds. From a theoretical
perspective, a ￿rm that maximizes its value from a mean-variance perspective has incentives to
hedge its income and expense ￿ows. This idea implies that a ￿rm whose income is highly correlated
with the exchange rate will have a higher fraction of debt denominated in dollars in order to match
the currency of its income and expense ￿ow. Therefore, one would expect that if higher values of
Si indicate a more signi￿cant foreign exposure of ￿rmi, then the expected sign of the coe￿cient µ
is positive. On the empirical front, past research in the area has demonstrated the importance of
controlling for this type of variables when explaining liability dollarization. 9
To control appropriately for this, one would need data on the amount of exports made by
each ￿rm and on the structure of the production process, speci￿cally on the amount of imported
inputs used by the ￿rm. Unfortunately these data are not available at the ￿rm level so we must
use proxy variables to control for these e￿ects.10 The proxies measure the degree of import and
export penetration in each sector of the economy and are inspired by Pacvnik (2002)’s work. They
are constructed from National Accounts data and they consist in the ratio of exports and imports
to total value added in each sector during each year. The Central Bank of Chile publishes this
9This is done, although with di￿erent proxy variables, by Bleakley and Cowan (2002) and Kedia and Mozumdar
(2003) and several of the other papers discussed in Section2
10In contrast to this paper, the data used by Gelos (2003) and Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) contain information
on the amount of foreign sales made by each ￿rm.
12information for a much smaller number of sectors than there are in the ISIC classi￿cation which is
the sectorial classi￿cation used in the ￿rms’ database. Therefore, it is the case that several ISIC
codes have the same export/import penetration value. 11
The speci￿c ￿nancial features of a ￿rm can exert an in￿uence on the amount of its dollar debt
through various mechanisms. Since dollar debt exposes the ￿rm to exchange rate risk, it follows
that those ￿rms who are already more leveraged will be less willing to take the extra risk of foreign
currency borrowing than a ￿rm that has less total debt due. This implies that one should include
the debt/capital ratio of each ￿rm in regression (1). At the same time, one would expect that
if foreign currency denominated ￿nancing is reserved for high-quality ￿rms, the size of each ￿rm
(measured by total assets) has a positive impact on the degree of debt dollarization. This is also
consistent with theories of corporate ￿nance that predict that the ￿nancial structures of ￿rm vary
as they grow.12
Finally, the regressions include sector and year ￿xed e￿ects. The year ￿xed e￿ects will capture
unobservable factors that might have a￿ected the decision of how much dollar debt the ￿rm will
take. Of this, one of the most important is the relative cost of each type of ￿nancing which is given
by the respective interest rates adjusted by the corresponding expected changes in the exchange rate.
The time period through which our sample spans witnessed signi￿cant ￿uctuation in these rates and
their di￿erences. This can be clearly seen in Figure 2 which plots a UF-denominated interest rate
and a dollar-denominated interest rate plus the observed (ex-post) exchange rate depreciation. 13
Even though exchange rate and other risks are omitted from these calculations, the path of both
series suggests that the relative cost of both type of ￿nancing varied widely during the period. It is
11It was necessary to match the sector classi￿cation used in the national accounts with the ISIC standard. This
was relatively simple since national accounts sectors follow closely the ISIC ones, although at a much higher level of
aggregation.
12The argument is that smaller just-born ￿rms don’t have access to formal capital markets which they gain only
as they become bigger and have more assets to pledge as collateral.
13The UF (Unidad de Fomento) is an in￿ation-indexed unit of account used in almost all ￿nancial contracts of more
than one year in Chile. The Dollar-Equivalent rate in Figure 2 corresponds to the right hand side of an uncovered
interest parity equation for real interest rates.
13especially striking to compare the situation during the ￿rst half of the 1990s and the last two years
of the sample.14
With respect to the second research question, the basic regression that we will use to estimate











Where INV measures the ￿rms investment, K is the capital stock, X is a series of controls that
a￿ect investment, D$ is the amount of dollar-denominated debt,DEP is the depreciation of the real
exchange rate and À is a random error term. This interaction term is precisely the balance-sheet
e￿ect and hence ± is the coe￿cient of greatest interest in this paper. The indexesi and t stand for
each individual ￿rm and time, respectively. All stock variables are measured at the beginning of
the period. The parameters to be estimated are denoted by¯, ± and !(L). The last of these is a
polynomial in the lag-operator L, and it captures the need to control for the persistent nature of
investment.
Equation (2) can be viewed as a particular form of the general panel data model:
Yit = ¯Xit + ®i + dt + "it (3)
Where ® and d correspond to the individual and time e￿ects respectively. The econometrics
literature has developed a series of techniques to deal with the problems that complicate the consis-
tent estimation of ¯. Of course, most of those problems originate in the presence of the unobservable
individual e￿ect ®i in equation (3). When the matrix X includes lagged values of the dependent
14It is worth to mention that during the ￿rst half of the 1990s Chile witnessed massive capital in￿ows attracted
by the arbitrage opportunities suggested in Figure2. That scenario was the one in which the Central Bank of Chile
established the world famous (but now defunct) controls to capital in￿ows.
14variable as in the case of investment equations, the traditional methods to deal with the individual
e￿ect create simultaneity among the right hand side variables and the error term. It is necessary
then to use some type of instrumental variable (IV) technique.
Since a detailed survey of panel-data econometrics is beyond the scope of this paper, we will
only mention here that we will use the Balestra-Nerlove IV methodology which instruments the
lagged dependent variable with higher order lags.
The speci￿cation we will use to estimate the balance-sheet e￿ect mechanism is based on the so
call generalized accelerator model as described by Hall et al. (2000) and used in several other studies.
In particular we will use the generalized accelerator model speci￿cation that uses the following as
explanatory variables:
1. Lagged investment. The presence of this term can be justi￿ed by the presence of adjustment
costs associated to increasing the capital stock.
2. Contemporary and lagged pro￿ts to capital ratio. This variable is used as a proxy of expected
future pro￿tability and other measures of the quality of the ￿rms’ project.
3. Contemporary and lagged sales to capital ratio. These are included to acknowledge the possi-
bility that ￿rms might not have access to perfect capital markets and hence the amount they
can invest is determined in part by the amount of resources they can generate. It is also pos-
sible that current and past sales also constitute a proxy for the expected future pro￿tability
of the ￿rm’s projects.15
The inclusion of variables like the ones listed in # 3 recognizes that in reality capital markets
have imperfections that make ￿rms’ ￿nancial characteristics in￿uence the amount of investment that
15We did not include an empirical proxy of Tobin’s q to control for ￿rm’s expected pro￿tability as many studies
do since not all the ￿rms included in this paper are listed in stock exchanges and therefore there is not information
about the market value of its capital stocks.
15they can undertake. Given the stage of development of the Chilean economy, it is entirely reasonable
to include these variables in the investment equation. The importance of cash ￿ows for Chilean
￿rms has been documented previously by Medina and ValdØs (1998) and Gallego and Loayza (2001).
Moreover, since the channel through which dollar debt and exchange rate ￿uctuations combine to
reduce investment is precisely one related to the ￿rm’s ￿nancial health, it is crucial to include other
controls like the ones listed in # 3 above. However, one should recall that we use data for ￿rms
that form part of conglomerates. This implies that in principle they have access to ￿nancing from
other business units of the conglomerate. Hence, the eventual correlation of cash ￿ow measures and
investment is more likely to be explained by the fact that contemporaneous cash ￿ow is a sign of
expected future pro￿tability instead of the main source of ￿nancing of the ￿rm.
The preceding variables will be referred to as the ￿traditional￿ determinants of investment.
In the regressions presented below, the balance-sheet terms are added as additional explanatory
variables. This is a similar estimation strategy as the one used in other papers that have studied
the balance-sheet e￿ects. The use of a similar speci￿cation has the advantage also that it discards
that any di￿erence in the empirical ￿ndings depend on the econometric model selected.
The data set assembled and used in this paper distinguishes between long-term and short-
term dollar debt. Up to our knowledge, the distinction between short term and long term debt in
the context of balance-sheet e￿ects has only been analyzed by Aguiar (2005). As was discussed
previously, that paper focuses on the post-Tequila Mexican crises which might limit the usefulness
of the results as policy guides for non-crises episodes. As we will explain later, the distinction among
short and long term debt is important in practice. Finally we will also analyze the extent to which
the balance-sheet e￿ect is non-linear and will do so including interaction terms with the stock of
dollar debt and real currency depreciation.16
16In language used in the estimation of production functions, we will include a full translog speci￿cation.
165 Empirical Evidence
5.1 What Determines Dollar Debt?
According to the discussion presented earlier, we analyze ￿rst the in￿uence of foreign exposure and
￿rms’ ￿nancial characteristics on the amount of dollar debt owed by each ￿rm. A distinct feature
of the data is that the variability in the degree of debt dollarization comes mostly from the cross-
section. In other words, there is not much change in the degree of dollarization of a given ￿rm over
time. Therefore we analyze the liability dollarization using a pooled regression in which the unit
of observation is the average for each ￿rm during the sample period. In panel econometrics jargon,
this corresponds to the between transformation of the standard panel data model.
Given this transformation, we are able to calculate an additional measure of foreign exposure.
This is the correlation of the ￿rm’s operational result (i.e. earnings before interest and taxes or
EBIT) growth rate with the growth rate the real exchange rate. For each ￿rm the correlation is
calculated over the whole sample period. We expect that, according to the hedging hypothesis,
the more correlated a ￿rm’s income is with the exchange rate, the bigger the importance of dollar-
denominated debt in its ￿nancial structure. As Figure 3 shows, there appears to be indeed a
positive association between both variables. Moreover, using this type of correlation gives us a ￿rm-
speci￿c measure of external exposure as opposed to the industry level export and import penetration
measures discussed earlier.
The positive correlation between both variables is con￿rmed also in the regressions presented
in Tables 1 and 2. The only di￿erence between these tables is the inclusion of industry-level dummies
in the second one. It should be noted that column (5) in those Tables corresponds to total foreign
currency debt: it includes foreign currencies di￿erent than the U.S. dollar. 17 As can be seen, the
17In general, these are relatively small amounts about which few details are provided in the data source. Indeed
when ￿rms have liabilities payable in other foreign currencies it is often the case that they are declared as ￿other
currencies￿ and the amount is published only in pesos. This amount in pesos was added to the dollar-denominated
17data indicate that dollar debt represents a higher fraction of total ￿nancing in bigger ￿rms and
those with a higher debt/equity ratio.
With respect to the foreign exposure measures, there are two main results both of which
support the hedging hypothesis. In ￿rst place, the correlation of the ￿rm’s EBIT and the real
exchange rate exerts a positive in￿uence on the amount of dollar debt hold by the ￿rm. Yet, as the
comparison of Table 1 and Table 2 reveals, the statistical signi￿cance of this variable fades away
when industry-level controls are included. This fact points to the existence of multicollinearity
between the industry-level controls and correlation of EBIT and real exchange rate growth rates.
From this perspective, these regressions shed some light on what industry-level dummies, commonly
used in the previous work on this topic, really measure. 18
In the second place, it is important to note that the export penetration measure calculated
here has a positive e￿ect on the liability dollarization of ￿rms. In contrast, the import penetration
measure doesn’t have a statistically signi￿cant e￿ect on debt dollarization. This result can be
interpreted in terms of the pricing-to-market assumption that characterizes many of the new open
economy models. If indeed exporters tend to set the price of their goods in terms of the foreign
currency, then exchange rate movements are not going to a￿ect import prices measured in domestic
currency. Hence, the performance of domestic ￿rms subject to import competition will be less
dependent on the exchange rate.
The panel regression results are presented in Table3 and Table 4 that include the ￿xed e￿ect
and panel estimation respectively. As can be seen, only the scale of the ￿rm, as measured by the
logarithm of total assets, has a signi￿cant e￿ect on the amount of dollar debt due by each ￿rm. The
lack of signi￿cance of the other regressors is explained mainly by their lack of signi￿cant variation
across time. Yet, the point estimates con￿rm the results of the pooled regressions discussed above.
debt. Implicitly then we assumed all foreign currency debt was issued in dollars in the series used in column (5).
18In other words these results suggest that the correlation between the growth rate of ￿rms’ EBIT and the real
exchange rate constitutes an adequate characterization of each industrial sector.
185.2 Is there a Balance-Sheet E￿ect?
As we noted in Section 2, a signi￿cant number of previous empirical papers on this topic has failed
to ￿nd a signi￿cant balance-sheet e￿ect as the one described by Krugman (1999). The leading
explanation for this has been that those ￿rms who issue dollar debt are precisely those who are
bene￿ted by devaluation. Given this we analyzed the relative performance of ￿rms with and without
dollar debt in periods of high exchange rate depreciation and in periods of relatively stable exchange
rate. In particular we examined the distribution of operational income growth between both types
of ￿rms in those periods. This was done using the Kernel density procedure in STATA and the
results appear in Figures 4 and 5. those ￿gures suggest, it seems to be the case that precisely
those ￿rms that engage in dollar debt are those whose income is positively related to exchange rate
movements. Thus, this fact appears to be one of the key explanations for the missing balance-sheet
phenomenon. Previous research has indeed pointed to this argument as the central explanation for
the absence of a negative balance-sheet e￿ect (see for instance Bleakley and Cowan (2002)). For
the case of Chile the importance of controlling for the correlation between ￿rms’ pro￿tability and
the real exchange rate to detect a balance-sheet e￿ect has been pointed out previously by Cowan
et al. (2006).
As we suggested earlier, the failure to detect a negative balance-sheet e￿ect could potentially
also be explained by the fact that the sample period used in some papers does not include episodes
of signi￿cant exchange rate depreciation. To shed some light on this conjecture, we ran a cross
section regression of investment for the year 2001 when both the real and nominal Chilean exchange
rate exhibit signi￿cant depreciation (recall Figure1) using a similar speci￿cation to the one used by
Bleakley and Cowan (2002). The results are presented in Table5 strongly suggest that the omission
of the high depreciation period explains the absence of a negative balance-sheet e￿ect. 19
19The balance-sheet is de￿ned as in equation (2): dollar debt stock at the end of period t ¡ 1 multiplied by the
change in the real exchange rate between t ¡ 1 and t and normalized by the initial capital stock.
19The coe￿cients estimated in Table 5 imply that dollar debt has a signi￿cant negative e￿ect
on investment during this year of high depreciation of the exchange rate. The fact that this result is
robust to the inclusion of 3-digit industry level controls (columns (3) and (4)) indicates that dollar
debt is not capturing merely a negative shock to the tradable sector of the economy.
The merits of the data set assembled for this paper are con￿rmed by the results in Table5
that show that the balance-sheet e￿ect associated with long-term debt is di￿erent from the one of
short-term debt. In particular, the negative balance-sheet e￿ect appears to be entirely linked to
long-term debt as suggested by the negative and signi￿cant coe￿cient estimated for this variable.
On the contrary, the coe￿cient on short-term dollar debt is not statistically signi￿cant and the
point estimate is even positive in some speci￿cations. This ￿nding that the negative balance-sheet
e￿ect is tied to long term debt instead of short term debt is exactly the opposite reported by Aguiar
(2005).
The panel regression results are presented in Table6. As explained earlier, these regressions
are estimated using an instrumental variable approach. The speci￿cation in column (1) is the most
similar to the ones used in previous studies in the sense that the balance-sheet e￿ect is measured
with respect to total debt. As can be seen both the point estimate and standard error indicate that
there is no balance-sheet e￿ect. If one interprets the results following the explanation of Bleakley
and Cowan (2002) for the absence of a balance-sheet e￿ect in many empirical papers, this implies
that the negative worth e￿ect and the productivity e￿ect cancel each other. Therefore, ￿rms appear
to hedge their risks e￿ciently. Moreover, according to the evidence presented in column (2), the
balance-sheet e￿ect does not appear to be non-linear: the square of the total balance-sheet variable
is not statistically signi￿cant and the point estimate is also close to zero.
As discussed earlier, the unique characteristics of the data set used in this paper allows us to
study if short-term debt and long-term debt have a di￿erent impact on the balance-sheet e￿ect. As
20columns (3) and (4) reveal, the two types of debt appear to have a di￿erent e￿ect on the level of
investment. Speci￿cally, and in line with the ￿ndings for year 2001, the balance-sheet e￿ect appears
to be linked to long-term debt as this term is negative and statistically signi￿cant.
Finally, column (5) indicates that the balance-sheet e￿ect is non-linear and associated with
long-term debt. In that speci￿cation quadratic and terms of the balance-sheet term and interactions
of the square of debt and depreciation are included. 20. It is especially important to note the strong
negative coe￿cient associated with the square of the depreciation rate when interacted with long-
term dollar debt. This suggests that the balance-sheet e￿ect deters investment more signi￿cantly
in periods when exchange rate depreciation is high.
The results obtained in our paper can be explained from an economic perspective along the
following lines. Regarding short-term debt, a signi￿cant part of it corresponds to debt directly
related to foreign trade like credit letters.21 Therefore, this type of dollar debt is ￿hedged￿ in the
sense that it is directly tied to an income ￿ow that is also positively correlated with the exchange
rate. In other words, ceteris paribus, a depreciation of the currency is expected to increase both
the income ￿ow and the debt payment with no e￿ect on the creditworthiness of the ￿rm. Moreover,
one could also interpret that short-term dollar debt is a proxy variable for the degree of positive
correlation between the ￿rm’s pro￿tability and real currency depreciation.
On the other hand, a real depreciation of the currency will increase the value of payments
associated with long-term debt both in the current period and in the future. In this sense the
creditworthiness of the ￿rm decreases permanently. Therefore, one would expect that the negative
balance-sheet e￿ect is linked to long term dollar debt precisely as the results in Tables5 and 6 show.
Related to this, it should be noted that the depreciation of the currency observed in the year
20This is similar to a trans-log speci￿cation as the ones used in to study production functions
21The claim that a big fraction of short-term debt is related to foreign trade comes from direct observation of the
data while the database was assembled.
212001 can be characterized as a persistent phenomenon: it took approximately two years for the
nominal and real exchange rates to return to values similar to ones observed before 2001. The fact
that negative balance-sheet e￿ects are detected when more clearly only when the change in the
exchange rate is of a more sustained nature could also explain why many studies report the absence
of a balance-sheet e￿ect.
Is a Balance-Sheet E￿ect Likely? Additional Evidence from the Stock and Foreign
Exchange Markets.
The regression evidence presented in the preceding subsection strongly suggests that there
exists a negative balance-sheet e￿ect associated to long-term debt dollar debt in periods of strong
depreciation of the exchange rate. This ￿nding stands out against what a signi￿cant part of previous
work has found according to the literature reviewed earlier. In order to strengthen our ￿nding of a
negative balance-sheet e￿ect we will present two additional pieces of evidence that help to explain
why a negative balance-sheet e￿ect is a reasonable result.
The ￿rst of these pieces is related to the strong negative correlation between Chile’s real
exchange rate and the price of commodities measured in U.S. dollars observed in international
markets. World commodity prices are used here as a proxy of the price of the goods sold by ￿rms in
Chile’s tradable sector.22 The negative correlation between both variables can be seen in Figure6
that plots the annual growth of the World Bank commodity price index (de￿ated by the U.S. CPI)
against the annual growth of the CPI-based Chilean real exchange rate. This ￿gure suggests that
periods of exchange rate depreciation tend to coincide with decreases in the real price of the goods
22The series corresponds to the World Bank Commodity Price Index for lower middle-income countries (LMIC).
The data was taken from the IFS. The results reported here are robust to the use of other commodity prices index
like the ones for Non-Metals, Non-Fuel and Primary Commodities.
22exported by Chilean ￿rms. This fact implies that the real income measured in domestic currency
does not increase when the real exchange rate depreciates precisely because the price in dollars of the
good produced by the ￿rm decreases. Formally, the real value of an export ￿rm income measured










X is the price in dollars of the good sold by the ￿rm, E is the peso/dollar exchange rate,
CPICH is the domestic price index and CPIUS is the U.S. price index. In terms of equation (4),
Figure 6 plots the growth rates of each term in the right hand side that in turn correspond to the
real-dollar price of the good and the CPI based real exchange rate.
This observation casts doubts on the leading explanation given in the literature to explain
the absence of balance-sheet e￿ects. That explanation argued that real depreciation had a coun-
terbalancing e￿ect on the ￿rm’s ￿nancial health through the higher value of the income ￿ow. The
evidence we’ve just presented points out that the counterbalancing e￿ect is not as strong in the
Chilean case because the price in dollar of the tradable goods falls as well. It is important to note
that the negative correlation of the real exchange rate and the price of exports has been also doc-
umented by Chen and Rogo￿ (2003) and Cashin, CØspedes and Sahay (2004) for other small open
economies.
The second piece of evidence that suggests that a negative balance-sheet e￿ect is a plausible
result is related to the behavior of the real exchange rate and the stock market valuation of ￿rms
in the tradable sector. The absence of a balance-sheet e￿ect will imply that the market value of
￿rms producing tradable goods should increase when the real exchange rate depreciates. This will
be the result of a competitiveness e￿ect that bene￿ts ￿rms in the tradable sector. The data gives
scant support to this hypothesis.
23Figure 7 plots the annual percentage change in the real value of ￿rms that belong to the
industrial sector against the annual percentage change in the real exchange rate. As it is evident,
the relation between both variables appears to be, if anything, negative. In other words a real
currency depreciation does not increase the value of capital of ￿rms in the tradable sector and
this might be explained by the presence of a negative balance-sheet e￿ect. It is important to add
that Von Furstenberg and Taborda (2003) also ￿nd a negative correlation between stock prices of
Mexican ￿rms and Mexico’s exchange rate.23
We can conclude then that both pieces of evidence, although they do not prove that a balance-
sheet e￿ect exists, are consistent with its presence and therefore provide some additional support
for the regression results presented above.
6 Conclusion
This paper has tried to increase our understanding of a new channel through which exchange rate
￿uctuations can a￿ect the economy of emerging markets: the ￿nancial health of ￿rms holding dollar
debt. The paper also studies the factors that explain why ￿rms contract dollar debt. Our work
complements previous studies in this area by providing evidence on the consequences of exchange
rate ￿uctuations and currency mismatches in non-crises situations distinguishing between the e￿ects
of long and short term debt.
The econometric evidence presented indicates that dollar debt represents a higher fraction
23Grossman and Levinsohn (1989) studied the relationship between the price of imports and the stock returns of
￿rms producing import-competing goods in the U.S. and report a positive relationship between both variables. The
evidence we present here is not entirely contradictory with their results. Our results indicate that commodity prices
in US dollars (i.e. price of Chilean exports) are negatively correlated with Chile’s real exchange rate. This implies
that, for a ￿rm that exports commodities, its income measured in pesos stays (roughly) constant when commodity
prices decrease (and conversely the currency su￿ers a real depreciation). Yet, the presence of dollar-denominated debt
in its ￿nancing structure produces a negative balance-sheet e￿ect and hence decreases the ￿rm’s pro￿ts and stock
return. Grossman and Levinsohn (1989) do not consider this e￿ect because (i) the import prices are quoted directly
in dollars (i.e. the domestic currency of U.S. ￿rms) (ii) their sample lacks information on the currency composition
of the ￿rms’ debt.
24of total liabilities for ￿rms with income positively tied to the real exchange rate. The data also
indicate that foreign-currency ￿nancing is more common in larger ￿rms and those that already have
access to external ￿nancing. All these results indicate that the observed pattern of foreign-currency
debt is consistent with the desire of ￿rms to hedge or match the risk of their income ￿ow with their
￿nancing sources.
Notwithstanding, foreign currency debt and real exchange rate ￿uctuations combine to pro-
duce a negative balance-sheet e￿ect. This e￿ect is stronger when the real exchange rate depreciation
is higher and is tied to long-term debt. Both elements indicate then that the channel through which
the e￿ect occurs is through a worsening of the ￿rm’s creditworthiness. With respect to policy
implications, this paper suggests that it is important to monitor the degree of foreign currency in-
debtedness in the economy since this could have an important impact on the behavior of the economy
in the aftermath of currency depreciations. This results complements the ￿ndings of Aguiar (2005)
who, in contrast to our results, ￿nds that the negative balance-sheet e￿ect is tied to short term debt.
As explained earlier, Aguiar (2005) studies the aftermath of the Tequila Crisis so his ￿nding regard-
ing the importance of short-term debt appears to be sensitive to the speci￿c episode he studies. In
this sense, the evidence from Chile presented in this paper might serve as a better policy guide for
more tranquil times since the sample does not include a major economic disruption as the Tequila
crisis. The experience of the Chilean economy might also be valuable since it provides evidence that
balance-sheet e￿ects might exist even in an economy with a relatively advanced domestic capital
market and where the overall degree of dollarization is moderate.
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27Table 1: Determinants of Dollar Debt: Pooled Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dollarized Dollarized Dollarized Foreign Foreign
Liabilities (%) Liabilities (%) Liabilities (%) Currency Currency
Short Term Long Term Debt Liabilities (%)
Debt/Equity 0.021 0.002 0.019 -0.006 0.021
(0.009)* (0.006) (0.007)** (0.023) (0.009)*
½(°
EBIT;°
RER) 0.066 0.043 0.023 0.209 0.065
(0.028)* (0.018)* (0.021) (0.071)** (0.029)*
Import Penetration 0.010 0.017 -0.007 0.038 0.010
(0.019) (0.012) (0.014) (0.048) (0.019)
Export Penetration 0.033 0.037 -0.004 0.130 0.038
(0.045) (0.029) (0.033) (0.115) (0.046)
Total Assets (log) 0.013 -0.001 0.014 0.036 0.013
(0.005)** (0.003) (0.004)** (0.012)** (0.005)*
Constant -0.172 0.047 -0.219 -0.432 -0.168
(0.085)* (0.054) (0.062)** (0.215)* (0.086)
Observations 114 114 114 114 114
R-squared 0.15 0.11 0.19 0.17 0.15
Standard errors in parentheses.
signi￿cant at 5%; ** signi￿cant at 1%
½(°EBIT;°RER) corresponds to the correlation between the growth rates of EBIT and the real exchange rate.
In (1), (2) and (3) the dependent variables is measured as fraction of total assets.
In (4) the dependent variables is measured as fraction of external ￿nancing (debt plus equity).
Column (5) includes other foreign currencies di￿erent than the U.S. dollar. Also measured as fraction of total assets.
28Table 2: Determinants of Dollar Debt: Pooled Regression
Includes industry dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dollarized Dollarized Dollarized Foreign Foreign
Liabilities (%) Liabilities (%) Liabilities (%) Currency Currency
Short Term Long Term Debt Liabilities (%)
Debt/Equity 0.042 0.006 0.036 0.058 0.040
(0.013)** (0.007) (0.010)** (0.030) (0.014)**
½(°
EBIT;°
RER) 0.052 0.027 0.026 0.141 0.048
(0.033) (0.018) (0.026) (0.074) (0.034)
Import Penetration -0.134 -0.058 -0.076 -0.296 -0.133
(0.070) (0.037) (0.055) (0.157) (0.072)
Export Penetration 0.420 0.250 0.170 1.028 0.414
(0.153)** (0.081)** (0.120) (0.341)** (0.156)**
Total Assets (log) 0.009 -0.005 0.014 0.023 0.010
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005)* (0.016) (0.007)
Constant -0.154 0.063 -0.217 -0.372 -0.169
(0.132) (0.070) (0.103)* (0.294) (0.135)
Observations 114 114 114 114 114
R
2 0.43 0.59 0.37 0.57 0.42
Standard errors in parentheses.
signi￿cant at 5%; ** signi￿cant at 1%
½(°EBIT;°RER) corresponds to the correlation between the growth rates of EBIT and the real exchange rate.
In (1), (2) and (3) the dependent variables is measured as fraction of total assets.
In (4) the dependent variables is measured as fraction of external ￿nancing (debt plus equity).
Column (5) includes other foreign currencies di￿erent than the U.S. dollar. Also measured as fraction of total assets.
Includes industry dummies
29Table 3: Determinants of Dollar Debt: Panel Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dollarized Dollarized Dollarized Foreign
Liabilities (%) Liabilities Liabilities Currency
Short Term (%) Long Term (%) Debt
Debt/Equity 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Import Penetration 0.002 0.011 -0.009 0.030
(0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.035)
Export Penetration 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.017
(0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.030)
Total assets (log) 0.026 0.006 0.020 0.033
(0.004)** (0.003) (0.004)** (0.012)**
Constant -0.387 -0.068 -0.319 -0.438
(0.073)** (0.050) (0.060)** (0.201)*
Observations 1272 1272 1272 1272
R
2 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.13
Standard errors in parentheses.
signi￿cant at 5%; ** signi￿cant at 1%
In (1), (2) and (3) the dependent variables is measured as fraction of total assets.
Column (5) includes other foreign currencies di￿erent than the U.S. dollar. Also measured as fraction of total assets.
Table 4: Determinants of Dollar Debt: Panel Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dollarized Dollarized Dollarized Foreign
Liabilities (%) Liabilities Liabilities Currency
Short Term (%) Long Term (%) Debt
Debt/Equity 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Import Penetration -0.000 0.009 -0.010 0.027
(0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.035)
Export Penetration 0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.021
(0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.029)
Total assets (log) 0.020 0.000 0.018 0.028
(0.003)** (0.002) (0.003)** (0.008)**
Constant 0.000 0.100 -0.300 0.000
(0.000) (0.059) (0.089)** (0.000)
Observations 1272 1272 1272 1272
Standard errors in parentheses.
signi￿cant at 5%; ** signi￿cant at 1% the growth rates of EBIT and the real exchange rate.
In (1), (2) and (3) the dependent variables is measured as fraction of total assets.
In (4) the dependent variables is measured as fraction of external ￿nancing (debt plus equity).
Includes industry and year dummies plus ￿rm-level random e￿ects.
30Table 5: Balance Sheet E￿ect in a High Depreciation Year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Traditional Investment Determinants
Investment Rate (t¡1) 0.001 0.0004 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.0027) (0.002) (0.002)
Pro￿ts to capital ratio 0.0003 0.0000 -0.002 -0.001
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.006) (0.006)
Pro￿ts to capital ratio (t¡1) 0.0001 0.001 0.004 0.003
(0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012)
Pro￿ts to capital ratio (t¡2) -0.011 -0.011 -0.014 -0.015
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008)* (0.008)*
Di￿erence log(sales) 0.166 0.111 -0.056 0.012
(0.263) (0.275) (0.227) (0.230)
Di￿erence log(sales) (t¡1) -0.018 -0.054 0.113 0.169
(0.206) (0.213) (0.215) (0.216)
Di￿erence log(sales) (t¡2) 0.036 0.010 0.209 0.295




Short Term -0.485 0.369
(0.437) (0.350)
Long Term -0.155 -0.210
(0.046)*** (0.035)***
Observations 135 135 135 135
R
2 0.27 0.27 0.73 0.74
Standard errors in parentheses.
signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
Columns (3) and (4) include industry level controls.
31Table 6: Investment and Balance Sheet E￿ects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Traditional Investment Determinants
Investment Rate (t¡1) 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
¢ log(sales) 0.073 0.073 0.075 0.076 0.072
(0.042)* (0.042)* (0.042)* (0.042)* (0.043)*
¢ log(sales) (t¡1) 0.068 0.068 0.07 0.073 0.063
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
¢ log(sales) (t¡2) 0.121 0.121 0.126 0.13 0.122
(0.069)* (0.069)* (0.069)* (0.070)* (0.070)*
Pro￿ts to capital ratio -0.015 -0.015 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Pro￿ts to capital ratio (t¡1) -0.0002 -0.0002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Pro￿ts to capital ratio (t¡2) 0.00008 0.00009 0.001 0.002 0.001







Short Term 0.001 0.002 0.006
(0.000)* (0.002) (0.012)














2 * DEP 0.000
(0.000)
(DEP)





2 * DEP 0.0002
(0.0001)**
Observations 922 922 922 922 922
Number of Firms 165 165 165 165 165
Standard errors in parentheses.
signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
DEP corresponds to the depreciation of the real exchange rate.
D$ corresponds to the amount of dollar denominated debt.
¢ is the ￿rst di￿erence operator.
All regressions include a constant term and year ￿xed e￿ects.
32Figure 1: Chile’s Nominal Exchange Rate (log)
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